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Abstract
Properties, which have long been used for reasoning
about systems, are sets of traces. Hyperproperties, intro-
duced here, are sets of properties. Hyperproperties can
express security policies, such as secure information ﬂow,
that properties cannot. Safety and liveness are generalized
to hyperproperties, and every hyperproperty is shown to be
the intersection of a safety hyperproperty and a liveness hy-
perproperty. A veriﬁcation technique for safety hyperprop-
erties is given and is shown to generalize prior techniques
for verifying secure information ﬂow. Reﬁnement is shown
to be valid for safety hyperproperties. A topological char-
acterization of hyperproperties is given.
1 Introduction
Important classes of security policies cannot be ex-
pressed using what have been termed properties [1, 24, 43,
11, 34, 40], sets of execution traces [18] for which member-
ship of a trace depends on the trace alone and not on which
other traces are in the property. For example, noninter-
ference [12] is a conﬁdentiality policy that stipulates com-
mands executed on behalf of users holding high clearances
have no effect on system behavior observed by users with
only low clearances. It is not a property, because whether
some given trace is allowed depends on whether another
trace (obtained by deleting command executions by high
users) is allowed. As a second example, stipulating a bound
on average response time over all executions is an availabil-
ity policy that cannot be speciﬁed as a property, because the
acceptability of delays in any given execution depends on
the magnitude of delays in all other executions.
Methods for specifying and reasoning about properties
that a system satisﬁes are well understood [36, 20, 19]. It
has been shown that every property is the intersection of a
safety property and a liveness property,1 where
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1Lamport [16] gave the ﬁrst informal deﬁnitions for safety and liveness
 a safety property proscribes “bad things” and can be
proved using an invariance argument, and
 a liveness property prescribes “good things” and can
be proved using a well-foundedness argument.
Safety and liveness thus not only form an intuitively ap-
pealing fundamental basis from which all properties can be
constructed, but they also are associated with speciﬁc veri-
ﬁcation methods. An analogous theory for security policies
would be quite appealing. The fact that security policies
also proscribe and prescribe behaviors of systems suggests
that such a theory might exist.
This paper initiates the development of that theory by in-
troducing hyperproperties, which are sets of properties (i.e.,
sets of sets of traces), and deﬁning two interesting classes
of hyperproperties: safety and liveness. We show:
 Hyperproperties can describe properties and, more-
over, can describe security policies, such as noninter-
ference and average response time, that properties can-
not. Indeed, we have not been able to ﬁnd require-
ments on system behavior that cannot be speciﬁed as
a hyperproperty. Deterministic, nondeterministic, and
probabilistic system models all can be handled using
hyperproperties.
 Every hyperproperty is the intersection of a safety hy-
perpropertyandalivenesshyperproperty. (Henceforth,
we shorten these terms to hypersafety and hyperlive-
ness.) Hypersafety and hyperliveness thus form a fun-
damental basis from which all hyperproperties can be
constructed.
 The topological characterization of properties [3] can
be generalized to characterize hyperproperties, and the
result is equivalent to the lower Vietoris topology [42,
26, 37].
properties, appropriating the terms from Petri net theory, and he gave the
ﬁrstformaldeﬁnitionofsafety[18]. AlpernandSchneider[3]gavetheﬁrst
formal deﬁnition of liveness and the proof that all properties are the inter-
section of safety and liveness properties; they later established the corre-
spondence of safety to invariance and of liveness to well-foundedness [4].
1We have not obtained complete veriﬁcation methods for
hypersafety or for hyperliveness, but we have been able to
generalize prior work on using invariance arguments to ver-
ify information-ﬂow policies [6, 40]. Our generalization is
applicable to a class of hyperproperties we introduce called
k-safety.
The theory we have developed is also able to shed light
on the problematic status of reﬁnement for security policies.
Reﬁnement never invalidates a property but can invalidate
a hyperproperty: Consider a system  that nondeterminis-
tically chooses to output 0, 1, or the value of a secret bit
h. System  satisﬁes the security policy “The possible out-
put values are independent of the values of secrets.” But
one reﬁnement of  is the system that always outputs h,
and this does not satisfy the security policy. Previous work
has identiﬁed certain policies [23] and composition opera-
tors [24] that are suitable for use with reﬁnement; we show
in this paper that satisfaction of safety hyperproperties is
preserved under reﬁnement of nondeterminism, yielding an
entire class of security policies to which reﬁnement is ap-
plicable.
We proceed as follows. Hyperproperties, hypersafety, k-
safety, and hyperliveness are deﬁned and explored in Sec-
tions 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Section 6 presents the
hyperproperty intersection theorem, topology is addressed
in Section 7, and Section 8 concludes. A guide to nota-
tion is provided in Appendix A, the formal details of some
of our longer examples of hyperproperties are given in Ap-
pendix B, and all proofs appear in Appendix C.
2 Hyperproperties
Many formalisms exist for modeling systems. We model
system execution with traces, where a trace is a sequence
of states; by employing rich enough notions of state, this
model is sufﬁciently general to encode many other repre-
sentations of executions.2 The structure of a state is not im-
portant in the following deﬁnitions, so we leave , the set of
states, abstract. However, the structure of a state is impor-
tant for real examples, so we introduce predicates and func-
tions, on states and on traces, as needed—e.g., for events,
timing, and probability.
Traces may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite and are categorized into
the following sets:
	n , 
	inf , !
	 , 	n [ 	inf:
2Appendix B discusses how to model a labeled transition system as a
set of traces, without losing information about the nondeterministic struc-
ture of the system. We leave the investigation of the meaning of hyper-
properties in other models [45] as future work.
For trace t = s0s1 ::: and index i, deﬁne the following
indexing notation:
t[i] , si
t[::i] , s0s1 :::si
t[i::] , sisi+1 :::
Concatenation of ﬁnite trace t and (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) trace t0
is denoted tt0. The empty trace is denoted .
A system is modeled by a non-empty set of inﬁnite
traces, called its executions. If a system execution termi-
nates (and thus could be represented by a ﬁnite trace), we
represent it as an inﬁnite trace by inﬁnitely stuttering the
ﬁnal state in the ﬁnite trace.
2.1 Properties
A property is a set of inﬁnite traces. The set of all prop-
erties is
Prop , P(	inf);
where P denotes powerset. A set T of traces satisﬁes a
property P, denoted T j= P, iff all the traces of T are in P:
T j= P , T  P:
Some security policies are expressible as properties. For
example, consider the policy, “The system may not write to
the network after reading from a ﬁle.” Formally, this is the
set of traces
NRW , ft 2 	inf j :(9i;j 2 N : i < j
^ isFileRead(t[i])
^ isNetworkWrite(t[j]))g; (2.1)
where isFileRead and isNetworkWrite are predicates on
states. Similarly, access control is a property requiring ev-
ery operation to be consistent with its requestor’s rights:
AC , ft 2 	inf j (8i 2 N :
rights(t[i])  acm(t[i   1])[subj(t[i]);
obj(t[i])])g: (2.2)
Function acm(s) yields the access control matrix in state s.
Function subj(s) yields the subject who requested the op-
eration that led to state s, function obj(s) yields the object
involved in that operation, and function rights(s) yields the
right(s) necessary for the operation to be allowed.
As another example, guaranteed service is a property re-
quiring that every request for service is eventually satisﬁed:
GS , ft 2 	inf j (8i 2 N :
isReq(t[i]) =)
(9j > i : isRespToReq(t[j];t[i])))g: (2.3)
2Predicate isReq(s) identiﬁes whether a request is initi-
ated in state s, and predicate isRespToReq(s0;s) identiﬁes
whether state s0 completes the response to the request initi-
ated in state s.
2.2 Hyperproperties
A hyperproperty is a set of sets of inﬁnite traces, or
equivalently, a set of properties. The set of all hyperproper-
ties is
HP , P(P(	inf))
= P(Prop):
The interpretation of a hyperproperty as a security policy
is that the hyperproperty speciﬁes exactly the systems al-
lowed by that policy. Each property in a hyperproperty is
an allowed system, specifying exactly which executions are
possible for that system. Thus a set T of traces satisﬁes
hyperproperty H, denoted T j= H, iff T is in H:
T j= H , T 2 H:
Note the use of bold type to denote hyperproperties and sets
of hyperproperties. See Appendix A for a guide to our other
typographical conventions and notation.
Given a property P, there is a unique hyperproperty,
which we denote [P], that expresses the same policy as P.
We call this hyperproperty the lift of P. For P and [P] to
express the same policy, they must be satisﬁed by the same
sets of traces. Thus we can derive a deﬁnition of [P]:
(8T 2 Prop : T j= P  T j= [P])
= (8T 2 Prop : T  P  T 2 [P])
= [P] = fT 2 Prop j T  Pg
= [P] = P(P):
Consequently, [P] , P(P).
2.3 Hyperproperties in Action
Properties are satisﬁed by traces, whereas hyperproper-
ties are satisﬁed by sets of traces. This additional level of
sets means that hyperproperties can be more expressive than
properties. We explore this added expressivity with some
examples.
Information ﬂow. Information-ﬂow security policies ex-
press requirements on what information may be learned by
users of a system. Users interact with systems by provid-
ing inputs and observing outputs. To model this interaction,
deﬁne function ev(s) as the input or output event, if any,
that occurs when a system transitions to state s. Assume
that at most one event, input or output, can occur at each
transition. Extend this notation to ev(t), denoting the se-
quence of events resulting from application of ev() to each
state in trace t.3 We further assume that each user of a sys-
tem is cleared at conﬁdentiality level L, representing low
(i.e., public) information, or H, representing high (i.e., se-
cret) information, and that each event is labeled with one of
these conﬁdentiality levels. Deﬁne evL(t) to be the subse-
quence of low events contained within ev(t), and evHin(t)
to be the subsequence of high input events contained within
ev(t).
Noninterference, as deﬁned by Goguen and Mese-
guer [12], requires that commands issued by users hold-
inghighclearancesberemovablewithoutaffectingobserva-
tions of users holding low clearances. Treating commands
as inputs and observations as outputs, we model this policy
as a hyperproperty requiring a system to contain, for any
trace t, a trace t0 that has no high inputs yet has the same
low events as t:
GMNI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 GMSys
=) (8t 2 T : (9t0 2 T :
evHin(t0) = 
^ evL(t) = evL(t0)))g: (2.4)
Antecedent T 2 GMSys expresses the requirement that T
be a system satisfying the assumptions made by Goguen
andMeseguer’sformalization: T mustbedeterministic, and
total with respect to inputs. We omit formalizing these re-
quirements as hyperproperties.
Generalized noninterference [22] generalizes Goguen
and Meseguer’s deﬁnition of noninterference to nondeter-
ministic systems. McLean’s formulation [24] of general-
ized noninterference requires a system to contain, for any
traces t1 and t2, an interleaved trace t3 whose high inputs
are the same as t1 and whose low events are the same as t2.
This is a hyperproperty:
GNI , fT 2 Prop j (8t1;t2 2 T :
(9t3 2 T : evHin(t3) = evHin(t1)
^ evL(t3) = evL(t2)))g: (2.5)
Observational determinism [33, 46] requires a system to
appear to a low user as a deterministic function of only the
low inputs. Thus, it is a hyperproperty requiring that if any
two traces have the same ﬁrst j   1 low events, then these
traces must have equivalent jth low events:
OD , fT 2 Prop j (8t1;t2 2 T;j 2 N :
evL(t1)[::j   1] = evL(t2)[::j   1]
=) evL(t1)[j] in evL(t2)[j]
_ evL(t1)[j] out evL(t2)[j])g: (2.6)
3Dependingonthenatureofeventsintheparticularsystemthatisbeing
modeled, it may be appropriate for ev(t) to eliminate stuttering of events.
3Here we have extended trace indexing notation to apply to
sequences of events. Events l1 and l2 are low input equiv-
alent, denoted l1 in l2, iff they are both low input events
(although the value input need not be the same in the two
events). In contrast, events l1 and l2 are low output equiva-
lent, denoted l1 out l2, iff they are both low output events
of the same value.
Bisimulation-baseddeﬁnitionsofinformation-ﬂowsecu-
rity policies can also be formulated as hyperproperties.4 We
give an example in Appendix B by formulating, as hyper-
property BCNI, Boudol and Castellani’s [7] bisimulation-
based deﬁnition of noninterference.
All information-ﬂow security policies we investigated
were found to be hyperproperties—not properties. This is
suggestive, but any stronger statement about the connec-
tion between information ﬂow and hyperproperties would
require a formal deﬁnition of information ﬂow policies, and
none is universally accepted. We believe, however, that in-
formation ﬂow is intrinsically tied to correlations between
(notwithin)executions. Hyperpropertiesaresufﬁcientlyex-
pressive to formulate such correlations, whereas properties
are not. In particular, GMNI is not a property, as argued
in Section 1, GNI is not a property because the presence of
any two traces in the system necessitates the presence of a
third trace, and OD is not a property because whether some
trace is allowed depends on the low events appearing in all
other traces of the system.
Service level agreements. A service level agreement
(SLA) speciﬁes acceptable performance of a system. Such
speciﬁcations commonly use statistics, including:
 average response time, the average time that elapses
between a request and a response;
 time service factor, the percentage of requests that are
serviced within a speciﬁed time; and
 percentage uptime, the percentage of time during
which the system is available to accept and service re-
quests.
These statistics can be used to deﬁne policies with respect
to each individual execution of a system or across all exe-
cutions of a system. In the former case, the SLA would be
a property. For example, the policy “The average response
time in each execution is less than 1 second” might not be
satisﬁed by a system if there are executions in which some
response times are much greater than 1 second. Yet if these
4Since hyperproperties are trace-based, this might at ﬁrst seem to
contradict results, such as Focardi and Gorrieri’s [11], stating that
bisimulation-based deﬁnitions are stronger (i.e., a ﬁner equivalence) than
trace-based deﬁnitions. However, by employing a richer notion of
state [36, x1.3] in traces than Focardi and Gorrieri do, our hyperproper-
ties are able to express bisimulations.
executions are rare, then the system might still satisfy the
policy “The average response time over all executions is
less than 1 second.” This latter SLA is not a property, but it
is a hyperproperty and can be stated formally as
RT , fT 2 Prop j
mean(
[
t2T
respTime(t))  1g: (2.7)
Function mean(X) denotes the mean of a set X of real
numbers, and function respTime(t) denotes the set of re-
sponse times (in seconds) from request/response events in
trace t.5 Policies derived from the other SLA statistics
above can similarly be expressed as hyperproperties.
Reﬁnement. One of the key differences between proper-
ties and hyperproperties is how they behave with respect
to reﬁnement of nondeterminism—removing traces from a
system’s set of executions. A system S is reﬁned by system
S0 iff S  S0. By deﬁnition, whenever a system satisﬁes
a property, any reﬁnement of the system also satisﬁes the
property. Thus, properties are reﬁnement-closed:
S j= P ^ S  S0 =) S0 j= P:
A hyperproperty is reﬁnement-closed if whenever a sys-
tem satisﬁes the hyperproperty, any reﬁnement of the sys-
tem also satisﬁes the hyperproperty. Deﬁne RC to be the
set of reﬁnement-closed hyperproperties. Hyperproperties
resulting from lifted properties are reﬁnement-closed:
S j= [P] ^ S  S0 =) S0 j= [P]:
However, hyperproperties in general are not reﬁnement-
closed. System  (Section 1) illustrates this fact.
Beyond hyperproperties? We introduced another level
of sets when generalizing properties to hyperproperties, and
in doing so we gained expressive power for specifying poli-
cies on systems. Thus, it is natural to ask whether intro-
ducing yet one more level of sets might also be useful. We
believe it is not. Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that
some set H of hyperproperties (i.e., H is a set of sets of
sets of traces) was more expressive than any hyperproperty.
Whatever the deﬁnition of satisfaction, H must either be
satisﬁed or not satisﬁed by any system S. So consider set
H of all systems that satisﬁes H. But H is a hyperproperty
(since it is a set of sets of traces), and H is equivalent to H,
so H is not more expressive than any hyperproperty.
5For mean() to be well-deﬁned, it sufﬁces that there be only a ﬁnite
number of requests in T and that every request is serviced in ﬁnite time.
The formulation of RT assumes all traces are equally likely. Modeling
the case where some traces are more likely than others requires a proba-
bility measure on sets of traces. Obtaining such a measure is discussed in
Section 6.
4Another way to rationalize adding a level of sets would
be to consider policies on sets of systems. For example, a
policy might require that a set of systems exhibit sufﬁcient
diversity [32], meaning the systems all implement the same
functionality but differ in their implementation details. This
policy can be modeled as a hyperproperty on a single sys-
tem that is a product6 of all the systems in the set. More
generally, a policy on a sequence S of systems might be
modeled as a set H of sequences of hyperproperties. Again,
by taking the product of each element of H, we obtain an
equivalent hyperproperty.
The above conclusions will not surprise students of
mathematical logic [25]. In ﬁrst-order logic, variables range
over individual elements of some universe; in second-order
logic, variables may also range over subsets of the uni-
verse. If the universe is the set 	inf of traces, then proper-
ties are ﬁrst-order predicates on traces, and hyperproperties
are second-order predicates on traces. Second-order logic
is more expressive than ﬁrst-order logic [41, x2.2], just as
hyperproperties are more expressive than properties. Fur-
ther, any higher-order logic (which would have variables
ranging over sets (of sets of...sets) of subsets of the uni-
verse) is reducible to second-order logic [41, x4.3], just as
we have reduced extra levels of sets, above, to hyperprop-
erties. We leave further investigation of this connection as
future work. One interesting avenue to explore would be
whether the full power of second-order logic is necessary
to express hyperproperties of interest. This has ramiﬁca-
tions for veriﬁcation of hyperproperties, because although
fullsecond-order logiccannot beeffectivelyand completely
axiomatized, fragments of it can be [41, x2.3].
3 Hypersafety
According to Alpern and Schneider [3], the “bad thing”
in a safety property must be both
 ﬁnitely observable, meaning its occurrence can be de-
tected in ﬁnite time, and
 irremediable, so its occurrence can never be remedi-
ated by future events.
For example, no-read-then-write NRW (2.1) and access
control AC (2.2) are both safety. The bad thing for NRW
is a ﬁnite trace in which a network write occurs after a ﬁle
read. This bad thing is ﬁnitely observable, because the write
can be detected in some ﬁnite preﬁx of the trace, and irre-
mediable, because the network write can never be undone.
For AC, the bad thing is similarly a ﬁnite trace in which an
operation is performed without appropriate rights.
6The product of systems T1 and T2 is the system com-
prising traces over pairs of states, deﬁned as: T1  T2 ,
f(t1[0];t2[0])(t1[1];t1[2])::: j t1 2 T1 ^ t2 2 T2g. Generaliz-
ing, the product of a set of n systems comprises traces over n-tuples of
states.
A bad thing is a ﬁnite trace that cannot be a preﬁx of any
execution satisfying the safety property. A ﬁnite trace t is
a preﬁx of a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) trace t0, denoted t  t0, iff
t0 = tt00 for some t00 2 	.
Safety property. A property S is a safety property [3]
iff
(8t 2 	inf : t = 2 S =) (9m 2 	n : m  t ^
(8t0 2 	inf : m  t0 =) t0 = 2 S))):
Deﬁne SP to be the set of all safety properties. Notice that
SP is itself a hyperproperty.
We generalize safety to hypersafety by generalizing the
bad thing from a ﬁnite trace to a ﬁnite7 set of ﬁnite traces.
Deﬁne Obs to be the set of such observations:
Obs , Pn(	n);
where Pn(X) denotes the set of all ﬁnite subsets of set X.
Preﬁx  on sets of traces is deﬁned as:8
T  T0 , (8t 2 T : (9t0 2 T0 : t  t0)):
Note that this deﬁnition allows T0 to contain new traces that
have no preﬁx in T.
Safety hyperproperty. A hyperproperty S is a safety
hyperproperty (equivalently, is hypersafety) iff
(8T 2 Prop : T = 2 S =) (9M 2 Obs : M  T
^ (8T0 2 Prop : M  T0 =) T0 = 2 S))):
The deﬁnition of hypersafety parallels the deﬁnition of
safety—the only change is that the domains involved now
include an extra level of sets. Deﬁne SHP to be the set of all
safety hyperproperties.
Some consequences of the deﬁnition of hypersafety are:
 Goguen and Meseguer’s noninterference GMNI (2.4)
is hypersafety. The bad thing is a pair (t;t0) of traces
where t0 contains no high inputs and contains the same
low inputs as t, yet t and t0 have different low outputs.
 Observational determinism OD (2.6) is hypersafety.
The bad thing is a pair of traces whose ﬁrst j   1 low
events are the same, yet whose jth events are different
low outputs.
7Inﬁnite sets might at ﬁrst seem an attractive alternative, and many of
the results in the rest of this paper would still hold. However, the topolog-
ical characterization given in Section 7 (speciﬁcally, Propositions 5 and 6)
would be sacriﬁced.
8Other deﬁnitions of preﬁx are possible, but inconsistent with our no-
tionofobservation. Thisdeﬁnitioncoincideswiththeorderingofthelower
(or Hoare) powerdomain on traces. We discuss this in Section 7.
5 Safety properties lift to safety hyperproperties.
Proposition 1. (8S 2 Prop : S 2 SP ()
[S] 2 SHP)
 Set SP of all safety properties is not a safety hyperpro-
perty: There is no bad thing that prevents an arbitrary
property from being extended to some safety property.
Reﬁnement of hypersafety. All safety hyperproperties
are reﬁnement-closed. Intuitively, this is because if a bad
thing excludes property T from membership in some safety
hyperproperty, then any property of which T is a reﬁnement
would also contain the same bad thing.
Theorem 1. SHP  RC
By this theorem, any information-ﬂow security policy
that is not reﬁnement-closed cannot be hypersafety. For ex-
ample, generalized noninterference GNI (2.5) is not hyper-
safety, because it is not reﬁnement-closed: a system con-
taining traces t1 and t2, yet not containing the interleaved
trace t3 required by the deﬁnition of GNI, may be extended
to a system containing t3.
Relational hyperproperties. A program might be mod-
eled as a system with a single action, which transitions from
the input state (the initial state in the execution) to the out-
put state (the ﬁnal state in the execution) with no other ob-
servable states.9 Deﬁne a relational hyperproperty as a hy-
perproperty on traces with such a single action. The ﬁrst
state in each trace is the initial state, the second state is the
ﬁnal state, and the second state is inﬁnitely stuttered to pro-
duceaninﬁnitetrace. Deﬁne	R tobethesetofsuchtraces,
and deﬁne RHP to be P(P(	R)), the set of all relational
hyperproperties.
Relational hyperproperties facilitate the deﬁnition of an
information-ﬂow security policy that is commonly used in
language-based security [35]. This policy, which we call
relational noninterference, requires execution of a program
 to maintain the equivalence of states to a low observer.
That is, if s0
i is the output state resulting from executing 
with input state si, and s1 and s2 are low-equivalent, then s0
1
must be low-equivalent to s0
2. In our formalism, relational
noninterference can be deﬁned as:
RNI , fT  	R j (8t1;t2 2 T :
evL(t1)[0] = evL(t2)[0]
=) evL(t1)[1] = evL(t2)[1])g: (3.1)
Inspecting this deﬁnition reveals it is a reﬁnement of obser-
vational determinism OD (2.6) where j = 1. Since OD is
hypersafety, RNI is also hypersafety.
9Since some programs do not terminate on some inputs, a special out-
put state might be added to denote nontermination.
4 Beyond 2-Safety
Recent work gives system transformations that reduce
verifying secure information ﬂow to verifying a property
of some transformed system. (Recall that secure informa-
tion ﬂow is a hyperproperty but not a property.) Pottier and
Simonet [31] develop a type system for verifying secure in-
formation ﬂow based on simultaneous reasoning about two
executions of a program. Darvas et al. [10] show that secure
information ﬂow can be expressed in dynamic logic. Barthe
et al. [6] give an equivalent formulation for Hoare logic and
temporal logic, based on a self-composition construction.
Deﬁne the sequential self-composition of P as the pro-
gram P;P0, where P0 denotes program P, but with every
variable renamed to a primed variable—e.g., variable x is
renamed to x0. Then, one way to verify that (termination-
insensitive) relational noninterference RNI (3.1) holds of
program P is to establish the following property of trans-
formed program P;P0:
If for every low variable l, before execution l = l0
holds, then when execution terminates l = l0 still
holds, no matter what the values of high variables
were.
Barthe et al. generalize the self-composition operator from
; to any operator that satisﬁes certain conditions, and they
note that parallel composition satisﬁes these conditions.
They also relax the equality constraints in the above prop-
erty to partial equivalence relations, obtaining a generaliza-
tion of relational noninterference.
Terauchi and Aiken [40] further generalize the applica-
bility of self-composition by showing that it can be used to
verify any 2-safety property, which they deﬁne informally
as a “property that can be refuted by observing two ﬁnite
traces;” their formal deﬁnition is very similar to a relational
hyperproperty.
Using hyperproperties, we can show that the above re-
sults are a special case of a more general theorem. Deﬁne a
k-safety hyperproperty as a safety hyperproperty in which
the bad thing never involves more than k traces.
k-safety hyperproperty. A hyperproperty S is a k-
safety hyperproperty (equivalently, is k-safety) iff
(8T 2 Prop : T = 2 S =) (9M 2 Obs :
M  T ^ jMj  k ^ (8T0 2 Prop :
M  T0 =) T0 = 2 S))):
This is the deﬁnition of hypersafety, with an added conjunct
“jMj  k”. Given a particular k, deﬁne KSHP(k) to be the
set of all k-safety hyperproperties.
As an example of a k-safety hyperproperty for any k,
consider a system that stores a secret by splitting it into
6k shares. Suppose that an action of the system is to out-
put share i. Then a hyperproperty of interest might be that
the system cannot, across any of its executions, output all
k shares (thereby outputting sufﬁcient information for the
secret to be reconstructed). We denote this k-safety hyper-
property as SSk.
Note that the 1-safety hyperproperties are the lifted
safety properties,
KSHP(1) = f[S] j S 2 SPg;
since the bad thing for a safety property is a single trace.
Thus “1-safety” and “safety” are synonymous.
The Terauchi and Aiken deﬁnition of 2-safety proper-
ties (which we now identify as KSHP(2), the 2-safety hy-
perproperties) is based on a relational model of program
execution, so it is limited to expressing relational 2-safety
hyperproperties. Relational noninterference RNI (3.1) is
an example of such a hyperproperty. Our deﬁnition, based
on a trace model of execution, is more general and allows
us to conclude that Goguen and Meseguer’s noninterfer-
ence GMNI (2.4) and observational determinism OD (2.6),
which are not relational, are also 2-safety hyperproperties.10
Deﬁne the parallel self-composition of system S as the
product system S  S consisting of traces over   :
S  S , f(t[0];t0[0])(t[1];t0[1])::: j t 2 S ^ t0 2 Sg:
Deﬁne the k-product of system S, denoted Sk, to be the k-
fold parallel self-composition of S, comprising traces over
k. Self-composition S  S is equivalent to 2-product S2.
Previous work has shown how to reduce a 2-safety hy-
perproperty of system S to a related safety property of S2.
The following theorem generalizes that. Let Sys be the set
of all systems. Then, for any system S, any k-safety hyper-
property of S can be reduced to a safety property of Sk.
Theorem 2. (8S 2 Sys;K 2 KSHP(k) : (9K 2 SP :
S j= K () Sk j= K))
The proof of this theorem (in Appendix C) shows how to
construct K from K. Thus, Theorem 2 suggests a veriﬁca-
tion technique for k-safety, namely to reduce a k-safety hy-
perproperty to a safety property, then verify the safety prop-
erty is satisﬁed by Sk using invariance arguments. Since in-
variance arguments are relatively complete for safety prop-
erties [4], Theorem 2 yields a relatively complete veriﬁca-
tion methodology for k-safety.
However, Theorem 2 does not provide the relatively
complete veriﬁcation procedure we seek for hypersafety,
because there are safety hyperproperties that are not k-
safety for any k. For example, consider the hyperproperty
10This conclusion resolves the conjecture of Terauchi and Aiken that
(termination-sensitive) secure information ﬂow over inﬁnite traces is “2-
liveness [sic],” for some deﬁnition of 2-liveness.
“a system cannot output all k shares of a secret for any k-
secret sharing;” formally, this is
SS ,
[
k
SSk:
This is not k-safety for any k, yet it is hypersafety, since any
property not contained in it violates some SSk.
5 Hyperliveness
According to Alpern and Schneider [3], the “good thing”
in a liveness property is
 always possible, no matter what has occurred so far,
and
 possibly inﬁnite, so it need not be a discrete event.
For example, guaranteed service GS (2.3) is a liveness
property in which the good thing is the eventual response
to a request. This good thing is always possible because a
response can always be appended to any ﬁnite trace con-
taining a request, and it is not inﬁnite because the response
is a discrete event.
Liveness property. Property L is a liveness property [3]
iff
(8t 2 	n : (9t0 2 	inf : t  t0 ^ t0 2 L)):
Deﬁne LP to be the set of all liveness properties. Not sur-
prisingly, LP is itself a hyperproperty.
Just as with hypersafety, we generalize liveness to hy-
perliveness by generalizing a ﬁnite trace to a ﬁnite set of
ﬁnite traces. The deﬁnition of hyperliveness is essentially
the same as the deﬁnition of liveness, except for an addi-
tional level of sets.
Liveness hyperproperty. Hyperproperty L is a liveness
hyperproperty (equivalently, is hyperliveness) iff
(8T 2 Obs : (9T0 2 Prop : T  T0 ^ T0 2 L)):
Deﬁne LHP to be the set of all liveness hyperproperties.
Some consequences of the deﬁnition of hyperliveness
are:
 Average response time RT (2.7) is not liveness but
it is hyperliveness: the good thing is that the aver-
age response time is low enough. If this policy were
approximated by limiting the maximum (rather than
mean) response time in each execution, the hyperpro-
perty would instead be a lifted safety property.
 The only hyperproperty that is both hypersafety and
hyperliveness is true, where true , Prop, the maxi-
mal hyperproperty with respect to the subset relation.
(The minimal hyperpropertyfalse, where false , f;g,
is hypersafety but not hyperliveness.)
7 Liveness properties lift to liveness hyperproperties.
Proposition 2. (8L 2 Prop : L 2 LP ()
[L] 2 LHP)
 Set LP of all liveness properties is a liveness hyper-
property: Every observation can be extended to any
liveness property.
 Similarly, set SP of all safety properties is a liveness
hyperproperty: Every observation can be extended to
some safety property.
Possibilistic information ﬂow. Some information-ﬂow
security policies, such as observational determinism
OD (2.6) and relational noninterference RNI (3.1), restrict
nondeterminism of a system from being publicly observ-
able. However, it could be useful to have observable non-
determinism. First, systems might exhibit nondeterminism
due to scheduling. For example, if the scheduler cannot be
inﬂuenced by secret information (i.e., the scheduler does
not serve as a covert timing channel), then it is reasonable
to allow the scheduler to behave nondeterministically. Sec-
ond, nondeterminism is a useful modeling abstraction when
dealing with probabilistic systems (which we consider in
more detail in Section 6). When the exact probabilities for
a system are unknown, they can be abstracted by nondeter-
minism. For at least these reasons, there has been a history
of research on possibilistic information-ﬂow security poli-
cies, beginning with nondeducibility [39] and generalized
noninterference [22]. Such policies are founded on the in-
tuition that low observers of a system should gain little from
their observations. Typically, these policies require that ev-
ery low observation is consistent with some large set of pos-
sible high behaviors.
McLean [24] argues that every possibilistic information-
ﬂow security policy is expressible as a selective interleaving
function. Such functions, given two executions of a system,
specify another trace that must also be an execution of the
system, as did the deﬁnition of generalized noninterference
GNI (2.5). McLean shows that possibilistic information-
ﬂow policies can be expressed as closure with respect to se-
lective interleaving functions. Mantel [21] generalizes from
these functions to closure operators, which extend a set S
of executions to a set S0 such that S  S0. Mantel argues
that every possibilistic information-ﬂow policy can be ex-
pressed as a closure operator.
Given a closure operator Cl that expresses a possibilistic
information-ﬂow policy, the hyperproperty PCl induced by
Cl is:
PCl , fCl(T) j T 2 Propg:
DeﬁnethesetPIFofallsuchhyperpropertiestobe
S
Cl PCl.
It is now easy to see that these are liveness hyperproperties:
any observation T can be extended to its closure.
Proposition 3. PIF  LHP
Possibilistic information-ﬂow policies, other than true, are
therefore never hypersafety. Another way to reach this
conclusion is to observe that closure operators sometimes
yield hyperproperties that are not reﬁnement-closed—yet,
by Theorem 1, every safety hyperproperty is reﬁnement-
closed.
Temporal logics. Consider the hyperproperty “for every
initial state, there is some terminating trace, though not all
traces need terminate,” denoted as DT. In branching-time
temporal logic, DT could be expressed more precisely as
DT , terminates; (5.1)
where terminates is a state predicate and  is the “not
never” operator.11 There is no liveness property equivalent
to DT [17]; an approximation would be the liveness prop-
erty that requires every trace to terminate. However, DT
is hyperliveness because any ﬁnite trace can be extended to
a set of executions, at least one of which terminates. This
example suggests that hyperproperties can be models for
branching-time temporal predicates whereas properties are
limited to modeling linear-time temporal predicates.
6 Other Hyperproperties
Hyperproperties are not necessarily either hypersafety
or hyperliveness. Consider a medical information system
that must maintain the conﬁdentiality of patient records and
must also eventually notify patients whenever their records
are accessed [5]. Assuming the conﬁdentiality requirement
is interpreted as observational determinism OD (2.6), this
system must both prevent bad things (OD, which is hyper-
safety) as well as guarantee good things (eventual notiﬁca-
tion, which can be formulated as liveness). As another ex-
ample, consider a proactive secret sharing system that must
maintain and periodically refresh a secret. Maintaining the
conﬁdentiality of the secret can be formulated as hyper-
safety, and the eventual refresh of the secret shares can be
formulated either as liveness (if every execution must even-
tually complete the refresh) or hyperliveness (if only some
executions must complete). Both of these examples illus-
trate hyperproperties that are intersections of (hyper)safety
and (hyper)liveness.
In fact, every hyperproperty is the intersection of a safety
hyperproperty and a liveness hyperproperty. This general-
izes the result of Alpern and Schneider [3] that every prop-
erty is the intersection of a safety property and a liveness
property.
Theorem 3. (8P 2 HP : (9S 2 SHP;L 2 LHP : P =
S \ L))
11Some temporal logics, such as CTL [8], express this formula as
EFterminates.
8Probabilistic Hyperproperties. Although the formula-
tion of systems and hyperproperties in Section 2 did not
include probabilities, it is straightforward to incorporate
them. A probabilistic system transitions from a state s to
a state s0 with probability p(s;s0).12 Deﬁne Prs;S(T) to be
the probability with which set T of ﬁnite traces is produced
by system S with initial state s. This measure can be con-
structed from p(;) [15, 29] and used in the deﬁnitions of
hyperproperties.
In information-ﬂow security, the original motivations for
adding probability to system models were to address covert
channels and to establish connections between information
theory and information ﬂow [27, 44, 13]. A security pol-
icy that emerged from this line of research was probabilis-
tic noninterference [14, 29]. Intuitively, this policy requires
that the probability of every low trace be the same for every
low-equivalent initial state. A formulation of this as hyper-
property PNI appears in Appendix B. PNI is an example
of a hyperproperty that is intrinsically neither hypersafety
nor hyperliveness: If two low traces have differing proba-
bilities in some observation, it may or may not be possible
to extend the observation to make the probabilities equal.
Because it is neither always possible nor always impossible
to do so, PNI is neither hypersafety nor hyperliveness.
To measure quantity of leakage from repeated experi-
ments in probabilistic programs, Clarkson et al. [9] use a
probabilistic denotational semantics. This semantics can be
used to deﬁne a system, and the traces of the system repre-
sent repeated executions of the program. The hyperproperty
“the quantity of leakage over every series of experiments on
deterministic program S is less than k bits” (denoted QL)
then can be shown to be hypersafety. For details, see Ap-
pendix B.
The channel capacity of a system is the rate (deﬁned as a
limit over all execution lengths) at which information ﬂows
through the system [13]. The hyperproperty “the channel
capacity is k bits” (denoted CC) can be shown to be hy-
perliveness. Intuitively, no matter what the rate is for some
ﬁnite preﬁx of the system, the rate can changed to any arbi-
trary amount by an appropriate extension that conveys more
or less information.
7 Topology
Topology enables an elegant characterization of the
structure of hyperproperties. We begin by summarizing the
topology of properties [38].
Consider an observer of an execution of a system, who is
permitted to see each new state as it is produced by the sys-
tem; otherwise, the system is opaque to the observer. The
observer attempts to determine whether property P holds of
12If this probability is dependent on the history of execution, then the
implementation must have available, in each state, enough information to
reconstruct that history.
the system. At any point in time, the observer has seen only
a ﬁnite preﬁx of the (inﬁnite) execution. Thus, the observer
should declare that the system satisﬁes P, after observing
ﬁnite trace t, only if all possible extensions of t will also
satisfy P. Abramsky names such properties ﬁnitely observ-
able [2].
As with the bad thing for a safety property, a ﬁnitely ob-
servable property must be detectable in ﬁnite time, and once
detected, hold thereafter. Formally, O is a ﬁnitely observ-
able property iff
(8t 2 	inf : t 2 O =) (9m 2 	n : m  t
^ (8t0 2 	inf : m  t0 =) t0 2 O))):
Deﬁne O to be the set of ﬁnitely observable properties.
Finitely observable properties satisfy two closure condi-
tions. First, if O1;:::;On are ﬁnitely observable, then Tn
i=1 Oi is also ﬁnitely observable. Second, if O is a (po-
tentially inﬁnite) set of ﬁnitely observable properties, then S
O2O O is also ﬁnitely observable. Thus we say that O is
closed under ﬁnite intersections and inﬁnite unions.
Recall that a topology on a set S is a set T  P(S)
such that T is closed under ﬁnite intersections and inﬁnite
unions. The elements of T are called open sets. Because
O satisﬁes these requirements, it is a topology on 	inf. We
call O the Plotkin topology after its inventor.
A convenient way to characterize a topology is to deﬁne
a base or a subbase for the topology. A base of topology
T is a set B  T such that every open set is a (potentially
inﬁnite) union of elements of B. A subbase is a set A  T
such that the collection of ﬁnite intersections of A is a base
for T . A base (also a subbase) of the Plotkin topology is
OB , f" t j t 2 	ng;
where " t , ft0 2 	inf j t  t0g is the completion of a
ﬁnite trace t. When t  t0 we say that t0 extends t. The
completion of t is thus the set of all inﬁnite extensions of t.
The open sets O of the Plotkin topology are the sets in the
closure of OB under inﬁnite unions.
Alpern and Schneider [3] established that safety proper-
ties correspond to closed sets, and liveness properties cor-
respond to dense sets, in the Plotkin topology. A closed set
is the complement of an open set, and a set that is dense in
T intersects every non-empty open set in T . (Hereafter, we
shorten dense in T to dense.) Intuitively, non-membership
in a closed set is ﬁnitely observable, with a ﬁnite trace con-
stituting the bad thing for a safety property. And any ﬁnite
observation can be extended to be in a dense set, constitut-
ing a good thing, so that dense set is live.
We want to construct a topology on sets of traces that
extends this correspondence to hyperproperties. The most
important step is generalizing the notion of ﬁnite observ-
abilityfrompropertiestohyperproperties. Section3already
9did this in generalizing a ﬁnite trace to a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite
traces—i.e., an observation. The observer, as before, sees
the system produce each new state in the execution. How-
ever, the observer may now reset the system at any time,
causing it to begin a new execution. At any ﬁnite point in
time, the observer has now collected a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite
(thus partial) executions.13 An observation is thus an ele-
ment of Obs, as deﬁned in Section 3.
Anextensionofanobservationshouldallowtheobserver
to perform additional resets of the system, yielding a larger
set of traces. An extension should also allow each execution
to proceed longer, yielding longer traces. So an extension
corresponds to trace set preﬁx  as deﬁned in Section 3.
The completion of observation M 2 Obs is
" M , fT 2 Prop j M  Tg:
Wecannowdeﬁneourtopologyonsetsoftracesinterms
of its subbase:
O
SB , f" M j M 2 Obsg:
The base O
B of our topology is then O
SB closed under
ﬁnite intersections. The base and subbase turn out to be the
same sets.
Proposition 4. O
B = O
SB
Finally, the topology O is O
B closed under inﬁnite unions.
Thus, open sets are unions of completed observations.
Next, we provide the appropriate characterizations of
safety and liveness for this topology. Deﬁne C to be the
closed sets and D to be the dense sets.
Proposition 5. SHP = C
Proposition 6. LHP = D
Thus, just as safety and liveness correspond to closed and
dense sets in the Plotkin topology, hypersafety and hyper-
liveness correspond to closed and dense sets in our general-
ization of that topology.
The topology we developed here is actually equivalent
to well-known topology. The Vietoris (or ﬁnite or convex
Vietoris) topology is a standard construction of a topology
on sets out of an underlying topology [42, 26]. This con-
struction can be decomposed into the lower Vietoris and
upper Vietoris constructions [37], which also yield topolo-
gies. Deﬁne VL(T ) to be the lower Vietoris construction,
which given topology T on space X produces a topology
on P(X). Our underlying topology was on traces, and we
constructed the lower Vietoris topology on sets of traces.
Theorem 4. O = VL(O)
13Equivalently, instead of allowing resets, the observer could run a ﬁnite
collection of copies of the system. At any ﬁnite point in time, an observa-
tion can be made, comprising the set of traces the copies have produced.
This theorem yields another topological characterization
of safety hyperproperties. The set of lifted safety proper-
ties, closedunderinﬁniteintersectionsandﬁniteunions(de-
noted ), is the set of safety hyperproperties.
Corollary 1. SHP = (f[S] j S 2 SPg)
Powerdomains. A powerdomain is a construction used to
model the semantics of nondeterminism [30]. The deﬁni-
tion of preﬁx  over sets of traces in Section 3 suggests
we are working with the lower (or Hoare) powerdomain on
traces. Theorem 4 validates this, since the lower Vietoris
topology corresponds to the lower powerdomain [37]. The
two other standard powerdomain constructions, the upper
(or Smyth) and convex (or Plotkin) powerdomains, simi-
larly correspond to the upper and convex Vietoris topolo-
gies [37]. These two topologies use different open sets than
the lower Vietoris topology we are using, changing the no-
tions of observable and trace preﬁx: The upper construction
makes all open sets reﬁnable, whereas the convex construc-
tion makes the impossibility of the production of a state
observable. Thus, neither the upper nor the convex con-
structions yield opens sets that are the ﬁnitely observable
properties; the equivalence of closed sets and hypersafety
consequently is lost. This means that the upper and convex
powerdomains on traces are unsuitable for our purposes. It
is possible that these powerdomains might nonetheless be
useful for a different semantic domain than traces; we leave
this as future work.
8 Concluding Remarks
Many examples of security policies have been classiﬁed
as hyperproperties in this paper. Figure 1 summarizes this
classiﬁcation.
Although this paper formulates security policies with hy-
perproperties, security policies are typically formulated in
terms of conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability. The re-
lation between these two formulations is an open question,
but we can offer some observations:
 Information-ﬂow conﬁdentiality is not a property, but
it is a hyperproperty, and it can be hypersafety (e.g.,
observational determinism) or hyperliveness (e.g.,
generalized noninterference).
 Availability is sometimes hypersafety (maximum re-
sponse time in any execution, which is also safety) and
sometimes hyperliveness (mean response time over all
executions).
 Integrity, which we have not discussed in this paper,
also includes examples from both hypersafety and hy-
perliveness.
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Figure 1. Classiﬁcation of security policies
The language of conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability
therefore would seem to be orthogonal to hypersafety and
hyperliveness. The language of hypersafety and hyperlive-
ness has the advantages of being formalized and providing
an orthogonal basis for constructing security policies. In
contrast, there is no formalization that simultaneously char-
acterizes conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability,14 nor are
conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability orthogonal.15
In this work, we developed a theory of hyperproperties
that parallels the theory of properties. There is a relatively
complete veriﬁcation methodology for properties: Given a
property P, construct a safety property S and a liveness
property L such that P = S \ L, then use invariance argu-
ments to verify S and well-foundedness arguments to ver-
ify L [3, 4]. We have taken steps toward generalizing this
methodology to apply to hyperproperties. Theorem 3 shows
that every hyperproperty P can be expressed as the inter-
section of a safety hyperproperty S and a liveness hyper-
property L, and the proof of Theorem 3 shows that S and
L can be constructed from P. If S is a k-safety hyperpro-
perty, then by Theorem 2, it can be veriﬁed using reasoning
about safety. It remains an open question whether general
methods exist that are relatively complete for veriﬁcation of
safety hyperproperties that are not k-safety, or for liveness
hyperproperties.16 Such methods would complete the ver-
14The closest example of which we are aware is Zheng and Myers [47],
who formalize a particular noninterference policy for conﬁdentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability.
15For example, the requirement that a principal be unable to read a value
could be interpreted as conﬁdentiality or unavailability of that value.
16If, as discussed at the end of Section 2, the full power of second-order
logic is necessary to express hyperproperties, then such methods could not
iﬁcation methodology for hyperproperties. Then, security
might take its place as “just another” functional requirement
to be veriﬁed.
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A Summary of Notation
P is a property, H is a hyperproperty, M is a named set
of properties, and N is a named set of hyperproperties. We
use bold to denote “hyper” and sans serif to denote named
sets. Predicates and functions always begin with lower case,
whereas properties always begin with upper case.
 set of all states
	n set of all ﬁnite traces
	inf set of all inﬁnite traces
	 set of all traces
t[i] trace index
t[::i] trace preﬁx
t[i::] trace sufﬁx
Prop set of all properties
P powerset operator
N the natural numbers
NRW property “no read then write”
AC property “access control”
GS property “guaranteed service”
HP set of all hyperproperties
[P] lift of property P to equivalent hyperproperty
GMNI hyperproperty “Goguen and Meseguer’s non-
interference”
GNI hyperproperty “generalized noninterference”
OD hyperproperty “observational determinism”
RT hyperproperty “average response time”
RC set of all reﬁnement-closed hyperproperties
SP set of all safety properties
Pn ﬁnite powerset operator (set of all ﬁnite sub-
sets)
Obs set of all observations
 trace (or trace set) preﬁx
SHP set of all safety hyperproperties
	R set of all relational traces
13RHP set of all relational hyperproperties
RNI hyperproperty “relational noninterference”
KSHP(k) set of all k-safety hyperproperties
Sys set of all systems
SS hyperproperty “secret sharing”
LP set of all liveness properties
LHP set of all liveness hyperproperties
true maximal hyperproperty
false minimal hyperproperty
PIF set of all possibilistic information-ﬂow hy-
perproperties
DT hyperproperty “sometimes terminates”
PNI hyperproperty “probabilistic noninterfer-
ence”
QL hyperproperty “quantitative leakage”
CC hyperproperty “channel capacity”
O open sets of Plotkin topology
" completion of observation
O open sets of our topology
C closed sets of our topology
D dense sets of our topology
VL lower Vietoris construction
 closure under inﬁnite intersection and ﬁnite
union
B Example Hyperproperties
Bisimulation. Boudol and Castellani [7] give a
bisimulation-based noninterference policy for concur-
rent programs. They model execution as a binary relation
! on program terms and memories—a program term
P and a memory  step to a new program term P0 and
memory 0. Deﬁne P, the set of states for program P,
to be the set of pairs of a program term and a memory,
prog(s) to be the program term in state s, and mem(s)
to be the memory in state s. Deﬁne traces(P) to be the
set of all traces t such that prog(t[0]) is P, and for all i,
t[i] ! t[i + 1]; this yields a semantic model of P as a set
of traces.
Let =L be an equivalence relation on memories such that
1 =L 2 means 1 and 2 are indistinguishable to a low
observer. Say that state s can take a step to state s0 when
there exists some trace t in traces(P) such that, for some
i, we have t[i] = s and t[i + 1] = s0. Informally, deﬁne
P
L (read “bisimilar”) to be a binary relation on P such
that if s1 is bisimilar to s2, then s1 and s2 must have indis-
tinguishable memories to a low observer. Further, if s1 can
take a step to reach state s0
1, then either s0
1 remains bisimilar
to s2, or s2 can take a step to reach s0
2 where s0
1 and s0
2 are
bisimilar. Formally, bisimilarity P
L is the largest symmet-
ric binary relation on P such that
s1 P
L s2 =) mem(s1) =L mem(s2)
^ (9t 2 traces(P);i 2 N;s0
1 2  :
t[i] = s1 ^ t[i + 1] = s0
1
=) s0
1 P
L s2
_ (9t0 2 traces(P);j 2 N;s0
2 2  :
t0[j] = s2 ^ t0[j + 1] = s0
2 ^
s0
1 P
L s0
2)):
Boudol and Castellani deﬁne program P to be secure,
which we denote as BCNI(P), iff it is bisimilar to itself in
all initially low-equivalent memories:
BCNI(P) , (81;2 : 1 =L 2
=) (P;1) P
L (P;2)):
The hyperproperty BCNI containing all secure programs
according to Boudol and Castellani’s deﬁnition is:
BCNI , fT 2 Prop j (9P : T = traces(P)
^ BCNI(P))g: (B.1)
We have shown how to model a particular bisimulation-
based deﬁnition of noninterference as a hyperproperty. But
the example also suggests a general methodology for mod-
eling other bisimulation-based deﬁnitions:
1. Model the system used in such a deﬁnition as a set of
traces, enriching set  of states as appropriate.
2. State the bisimulation  over .
3. Deﬁne the hyperproperty, using .
Although the second and third steps in this methodology de-
pend on the particular bisimulation-based deﬁnition being
modeled, there is a general construction for the ﬁrst step.
The system model generally used for bisimulation-based
deﬁnitions is a labeled transition system, a triple (S;L;!)
where S is a set of LTS-states,17 L is a set of labels, and !
is a relation on S  L  S [28]. Elements of relation !
are usually notated s1
` ! s2, meaning that the system has a
transition labeled ` from LTS-state s1 to LTS-state s2.
To model labeled transition system (S;L;!) as a set of
traces, it sufﬁces to deﬁne the state space  for systems to
be S  L. Given state s 2 , let st(s) denote the LTS-
state from s and lab(s) denote the label from s. Deﬁne
traces(S;L;!) to be
ft j (8i 2 N : st(t[i])
lab(t[i+1])
! st(t[i + 1]))g:
17We use the term LTS-state to distinguish these from the states deﬁned
in Section 2.
14Note that this construction would not work with an im-
poverished notion of state, as observed by Focardi and Gor-
rieri [11] for states that are elements of L. Deﬁning a state
as an element of S  L captures enough information in the
set of traces to express bisimulation-based policies.
Probabilistic noninterference. To formulate probabilis-
tic noninterference as a hyperproperty, we need some nota-
tion:
 Let the low equivalence class of a ﬁnite trace t be de-
noted [t]L, where
[t]L , ft0 2 	n j ev(t;L) = ev(t0;L)g:
Prs;S([t]L) is the probability that system S, starting in
state s, produces an execution low-equivalent to t.
 Let the set of initial states of property T be denoted
Init(T), where
Init(T) , fs j fsg  Tg:
Probabilistic noninterference can then be expressed as
PNI , fT 2 Prop j (8s1;s2 2 Init(T) :
ev(s1;L) = ev(s2;L) =)
(8t 2 	inf :
Prs1;T([t]L) = Prs2;T([t]L)))g:
Hyperproperty PNI is neither hypersafety nor hyperlive-
ness. It is not hypersafety, because even if T fails to be
in PNI because of some equivalence class [t]L, it may be
possible to extend T to be in PNI by extending some pre-
ﬁx of [t]L in T.18 Neither is PNI hyperliveness: A sys-
tem that deterministically produces two non-low-equivalent
traces from two initial low-equivalent states cannot be ex-
tended to satisfy PNI.
Quantitative ﬂow. In the model of Clarkson et al. [9], a
state has a high component and a low component. A re-
peated experiment on program S is a series of executions of
S. In each execution, the initial state must have the same
high component but may have a different low component.
We use traces to represent repeated experiments. The
ﬁrst event in the trace is the high component of the initial
state. After this follows a series of pairs of low input and
low output events. Each low output must have the correct
18Consider two low-equivalent initial states s1 and s2 of T. Suppose
that the probability of [t]L from s1 is 0, but that the probability of some
preﬁx of [t]L is 1. Further suppose that the probability of [t]L from s2
is 1. These assumptions imply that T = 2 PNI. But it may be possible to
extend the preﬁx of [t]L from s1 such that the trace is now low-equivalent
to t. This extended system would now satisfy PNI. Thus PNI is not
hypersafety.
probability of occurring according to S, the initial high in-
put component, and the most recent low input component.
The probabilistic behavior of S is modeled by a semantics
JSK that maps inputs states to output distributions. Thus,
(JSKs)(s0) is the probability that S begun in state s termi-
nates in state s0.
Let Syst(S) denote the system of such traces resulting
from program S:
Syst(S) , ft 2 	n j (8even i :
ev(t[i];H) = ev(t[0];H)
^ p(t[i + 1]) = (JSKt[i])(t[i + 1]))g:
Note that p(s) is not deﬁned at all states in these traces. Fur-
ther, the set of program states must be ﬁnite for the proba-
bility distributions to be well-deﬁned.
We now formalize the quantity of ﬂow over a trace t.
Each pair of states t[i] and t[i + 1] can be used to deﬁne
an experiment, which describes how an attacker’s beliefs
change as a result of observing execution of the program.
The quantity of ﬂow in an experiment follows from deﬁni-
tions given in [9], and the quantity of ﬂow over the trace is
the sum of the ﬂow for each experiment in the trace:
Q(bH;t) ,
(jtj 1)=2 X
i=0
Q(E(t;i;bH))
E(t;i;bH) , hpre = E(t;i   1):post;
h = ev(t[2i];H);l = ev(t[2i];L);
post = (bH;l)jev(t[2i + 1];L)Hi
(bH;l) , s:bH(ev(s;H)  Pr([(ev(s;H) [ l);
ev(s;L)]):
Hyperproperty QL is the set of all systems that exhibit
less than k bits of ﬂow over any experiment:
QL , fT 2 Prop j (9S : T = Syst(S)
^ (8t 2 T;bH : Q(bH;t)  k))g:
C Proofs
Proposition 1. (8S 2 Prop : S 2 SP () [S] 2 SHP)
Proof. By mutual implication.
()) Let S be an arbitrary safety property. We want to show
that [S] is a safety hyperproperty—i.e., any property T
not in [S] contains some bad thing.
First, we ﬁnd a bad thing M for T. By the deﬁnition
of lifting, [S] = P(S) = fP 2 Prop j P  Sg. Since
T is not in this set, T 6 S. So some trace t is in T
but not in S. By the deﬁnition of safety, if t = 2 S, there
15is some ﬁnite trace m that is a bad thing for S. So no
extension of m is in S. Deﬁne M to be fmg.
Second, we show that M is irremediable. Note that
M  T because m  t and t 2 T. Let T0 be an
arbitrary property that extends M—i.e., M  T0. By
the deﬁnition of , there exists a t0 2 T0 such that
m  t0. We established above that no extension of
m is in S, so t0 = 2 S. But, again by the deﬁnition of
lifting, T0 = 2 [S], since T0 contains a trace not in S.
Thus, by deﬁnition, [S] is hypersafety.
(() Let S be an arbitrary property such that [S] is hyper-
safety. We want to show that S is safety. Our strategy
is as above—we ﬁnd a bad thing and then show that it
is irremediable.
Consider any t such that t = 2 S. By the deﬁnition of
lifting, we have that ftg = 2 [S]. By the deﬁnition of
hypersafety applied to [S], there exists an M  ftg
such that for all T0  M, we have T0 = 2 [S]. Consider
M: All traces in it must be preﬁxes of t, by the deﬁ-
nition of . Choose the longest such preﬁx in M and
denote it as m. This m serves as a bad thing for t, as
we show next.
Lett0 bearbitrarysuchthatm  t0, andletT0 = ft0g.
By construction, M  T0, so T0 = 2 [S] by the above
application of the deﬁnition of hypersafety. But this
implies that t0 = 2 S, by the deﬁnition of lifting.
We have shown that, for any t = 2 S, there exists an
m  t, such that for any t0  m, we have t0 = 2 S.
Therefore, S is safety, by deﬁnition.
Theorem 1. SHP  RC
Proof. Assume that S is hypersafety. For sake of contra-
diction, also assume that S is not reﬁnement-closed. This
latter assumption implies that there exist two properties T
and T0 such that T 2 S, and T0 = 2 S, yet T  T0. By the
deﬁnition of hypersafety, since T0 = 2 S, there exists an ob-
servation M that is a bad thing for T0—i.e., M  T0 and for
all T00  M, T00 = 2 S. Consider this M. By the deﬁnition
of , since T  T0 and M  T0, we have M  T. Then
T is an instance of T00 above, which means T = 2 S. But this
contradictsT 2 S. Therefore, S mustbereﬁnement-closed.
To see that the subset relation is strict, consider liveness
propertyguaranteedserviceGS (2.3). Whenliftedtohyper-
property [GS], the result is reﬁnement-closed by deﬁnition
of []. But GS is liveness, and therefore cannot be safety or
hypersafety.
Theorem 2. (8S 2 Sys;K 2 KSHP(k) : (9K 2 SP :
S j= K () Sk j= K))
Proof. Let K be an arbitrary k-safety hyperproperty of sys-
tem S. Our strategy is to construct a safety property K that
holds of system Sk exactly when K holds of S.
Since K is k-safety, every property not contained in it
has some bad thing of size at most k—i.e., for all T = 2 K,
there exists an observation M where jMj  k and M  T,
such that for all T0  M, T0 = 2 K. We construct the set M
of all such bad things:
M , fM 2 Obs j jMj  k ^ (9T 2 Prop :
T = 2 K ^ M  T ^ (8T0 2 Prop :
T0  M =) T0 = 2 K))g:
Consider a property T such that jTj  k. Construct a
ﬁnite list of traces t1;t2;:::;tk such that ti 2 T for all i.
Further, we require that no ti is equal to any tl, for any i and
l, unless jTj < k. We construct a trace t such that t[j] is the
tuple (t1[j];t2[j];:::;tk[j]); note that t is a trace over state
space k. Let trace t so constructed from T be denoted
zipk(T), and let the inverse of this construction be denoted
unzipk(t). We can also apply this notation to observations,
which are ﬁnite sets of ﬁnite traces.19
Now, consider zipk(M) for any M 2 M. This is a bad
thing for K and system Sk. So we can now construct safety
property K. Let K be the set of traces over k such that no
trace in K is a bad thing for any M 2 M:
K , ftk j :(9M 2 Obs : M 2 M
^ zipk(M)  tk)g;
where tk denotes a trace t over space k.
To see that K is safety, suppose that tk = 2 K. Then by
the deﬁnition of K, there must exist some M 2 M such that
zipk(M)  tk. Consider any trace uk  zipk(M). By the
deﬁnition of K, we have that uk = 2 K. Thus, for any trace
tk not in K, there is some ﬁnite bad thing zipk(M), such
that no extension uk of the bad thing is in K. By deﬁnition,
K is therefore safety.
Finally, we need to show that S satisﬁes K exactly when
Sk satisﬁes K. We do so by mutual implication.
()) Suppose S j= K. Then, by deﬁnition, S 2 K. For
sake of contradiction, suppose that Sk 6 K. Then,
by the deﬁnition of subset, there exists some tk 2 Sk
such that tk = 2 K. Let T be unzipk(tk). By the deﬁ-
nition of K, there must exist some M 2 M such that
19In this case, the ti have ﬁnite and potentially differing length. So if
j > jtij, let ti[j] = ? for some new state ? = 2 . Thus, zipk(T) is a
trace over state space ([?)k. We redeﬁne trace preﬁx  over this space
to ignore ?: let t  t0 iff, for some t00 that is a trace over , dte = dt0et00,
where dte is the truncation of t that removes any ? states. For notational
simplicity, we omit this technicality in the remainder of the proof.
16zipk(M)  tk. Applying unzipk() to this predicate,
and noting that unzip is monotonic with respect to ,
we obtain M  unzipk(tk). By the deﬁnition of T,
we then have that M  T. By the construction of M,
T therefore cannot be in K. By the construction of Sk
and the deﬁnition of T, each trace in T must also be a
trace of S. So by deﬁnition, T  S. By transitivity,
we have that M  S. By the construction of M, S
then cannot be in K. But this contradicts the fact that
S 2 K. Therefore, Sk  K, so by deﬁnition Sk j= K.
(() Suppose Sk j= K. Then, by deﬁnition, Sk  K.
Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that S does not sat-
isfy K. Then, by deﬁnition, S = 2 K. Since K is k-
safety, this means that there exists an M  S, where
jMj  k, such that for all T0  M, T0 = 2 K. Let
mk be zipk(M), and let sk be a trace of Sk such that
mk  sk (such a trace must exist since M  S).
By the construction of K, for any tk  mk, we have
that tk = 2 K. Therefore, sk = 2 K, and it follows that
Sk 6 K. But this contradicts the fact that Sk  K.
Therefore, S 2 K, so by deﬁnition S j= K.
Proposition 2. (8L 2 Prop : L 2 LP () [L] 2 LHP)
Proof. By mutual implication.
()) Let L be an arbitrary liveness property. We want to
show that [L] is a liveness hyperproperty—i.e., any ob-
servation M can be extended to a property T that is
contained in [L]. So let M be an arbitrary observa-
tion. By the deﬁnition of liveness, for each m 2 M,
there exists some t  m such that t 2 L. For a given
m, let that trace t be denoted tm. Construct the set
T =
S
m2Mftmg. Since all the tm are elements of L,
we have T  L. By the deﬁnition of lifting, it follows
that T is contained in [L]. Further, T extends M by the
construction of T. Thus, T satisﬁes the requirements
of the property we needed to construct. By deﬁnition,
[L] is hyperliveness.
(() Let L be an arbitrary property such that [L] is hyper-
liveness. We want to show that L is liveness. So con-
sider an arbitrary trace t, and let T = ftg. Since [L]
is hyperliveness, we have that there exists a T0 such
that T  T0 and T0 2 [L]. Since T  T0 and
T = ftg, there exists a t0 such that t  t0 and t0 2 T0,
by the deﬁnition of . By the deﬁnition of lifting, if
t0 2 T0 2 [L], then it must be the case that t0 2 L.
Thus, for any t, there exists a t0 such that t  t0 and
t0 2 L. Therefore, L is liveness, by deﬁnition.
Proposition 3. PIF  LHP
Proof. Let P be an arbitrary possibilistic information-ﬂow
hyperproperty, andletClP betheclosureoperatorthatMan-
tel [21] would associate with P.20 Then, by Mantel’s Def-
inition 10, it must be the case that P = fClP(T) j T 2
Propg. Closure operators must satisfy three axioms; below,
we use one of these: X  Cl(X).
To show that P is hyperliveness, let T 2 Obs be arbi-
trary. By the deﬁnition of hyperliveness, we need to show
that there exists a T0 2 Prop such that T  T0 and T0 2 P.
Let T0 be ClP(^ T), where ^ T denotes the embedding of T
into Prop by inﬁnitely stuttering the ﬁnal state of each trace
in T, as discussed in Section 2. By the closure axiom above,
we have that ^ T  ClP(^ T). So by the deﬁnition of , we
can conclude T  ClP(^ T) = T0. Further, T0 must be
an element of P since it is the ClP-closure of property ^ T.
Therefore, T0 satisﬁes the required conditions, and P is hy-
perliveness.
To see that the subset relation is strict, consider liveness
property GS (guaranteed service) from Section 2. It cor-
responds to liveness hyperproperty [GS], but has no corre-
sponding closure operator. For suppose that such a closure
operator did exist, and consider an inﬁnite trace t in which
service fails to occur. The closure of any set containing t
must still contain t, by the axiom above. But then the clo-
sure does not satisfy GS, and so the closure operator cannot
correspond to [GS].
Theorem 3. (8P 2 HP : (9S 2 SHP;L 2 LHP : P =
S \ L))
This theorem can be easily proved by adapting either the
logical [36] or topological [3] proof of the intersection the-
orem for ordinary properties. The domains involved are
merely upgraded to include an additional level of sets. Here
we take the former approach and rehearse the logical proof.
Proof. Our strategy is as follows. Given hyperproperty P,
we construct safety hyperproperty S that contains P as a
subset. We also construct liveness hyperproperty L that
contains P. The intersection of S and L then necessarily
contains P, and we will show that the intersection is, in fact,
exactly P.
To construct S, we deﬁne the safety hyperproperty
Safe(P), which stipulates that the hyperliveness of P is
never violated. A bad thing for this safety hyperproperty
is any set of traces that cannot be extended to satisfy P. So
we require that Safe(P) contains only sets T of traces such
20More precisely, Mantel argues that every “possibilistic information-
ﬂow property [sic]” can be expressed as a basic security predicate, and
that each basic security predicate induces a set of closure operators. Any
element of this set sufﬁces to instantiate ClP. Also, Mantel’s closure op-
erators were over ﬁnite traces, and we have generalized to inﬁnite traces.
17that any observation of T can be extended to satisfy P. For-
mally,
Safe(P) , fT 2 Prop j (8M 2 Obs : M  T
=) (9T0 2 Prop : M  T0
^ T0 2 P))g:
ItisstraightforwardtoestablishthatSafe(P)ishypersafety.
Any set T not contained in Safe(P) must satisfy the nega-
tion of the predicate in the above deﬁnition of Safe(P)—
i.e., (9M 2 Obs : M  T ^ (8T0 2 Prop : M 
T0 =) T0 = 2 P)). This is exactly the deﬁnition of
hypersafety.
Similarly, to construct L, we deﬁne the liveness hyper-
property Live(P). It stipulates that is always possible either
to satisfy P or to become impossible, due to some bad thing,
to satisfy P. In the latter case, a safety hyperproperty has
been violated—namely, Safe(P). Formally,
Live(P) , P [ Safe(P);
where H denotes the complement of hyperproperty H with
respect to HP. To show that Live(P) is hyperliveness, con-
sider any observation T. Suppose that T can be extended
to some property T0 such that T0 2 P. Then T0 is also in
Live(P), so Live(P) is hyperliveness for T. On the other
hand, if T cannot be extended to satisfy P, then T is a bad
thing for Safe(P)—i.e., (8T0 2 Prop : T  T0 =)
T0 = 2 P). Thus T is not in Safe(P), and therefore it is in
Safe(P). Thus, Live(P) is again hyperliveness for T. We
conclude that Live(P) is hyperliveness.
Next, note that P  Safe(P), because any element T of
P satisﬁes the deﬁnition of Safe(P). In particular, for any
M  T, there is a T0  M such that T0 2 P—namely,
T0 = T. Thus, Safe(P) = P [ Safe(P).
Finally, let S = Safe(P) and L = Live(P), and we
prove the theorem by simple set manipulation:
S \ L = Safe(P) \ Live(P)
= (P [ Safe(P)) \ (P [ Safe(P))
= P \ (Safe(P) [ Safe(P))
= P \ HP
= P
Proposition 4. O
B = O
SB
Proof. By mutual containment.
() By deﬁnition, the elements of O
B are ﬁnite intersec-
tions of elements of O
SB. Thus, every element of
O
SB is already trivially an element of O
B.
() Let N be an arbitrary element of O
B. By the deﬁni-
tion of a base, we can write N as
T
i " Mi, where i
ranges over a ﬁnite index set and each Mi is an obser-
vation. We want to show that there exists an element
" N of O
SB such that N =" N. So consider N. Every
property T in it must extend every Mi. Thus, by the
deﬁnition of , every such property T extends
S
i Mi.
Therefore N ="
S
i Mi. Our desired observation N is
thus
S
i Mi. Note that, for N to be a valid observation,
it must be a ﬁnite set. The union over Mi must there-
fore result in a ﬁnite set—which it does, since i ranges
over a ﬁnite index set.
Proposition 5. SHP = C
Proof. By mutual containment.
() Let S be an arbitrary safety hyperproperty. We need
to show that it is also a closed set. By the deﬁnition
of closed, this is equivalent to showing that S is the
complementofanopenset. Ourstrategyistoconstruct
hyperproperty O, show that O and S are equal, and
show that O is open.
By the deﬁnition of hypersafety, we have that any
property T that is not a member of S—and thus is a
member of S—must contain some bad thing. Consider
the set M 2 P(Obs) of all bad things for S. M con-
tains one or more elements for every property in S:
M , fM 2 Obs j (9T 2 S : M  T
^ (8T0 2 Prop : M  T0
=) T0 2 S))g:
Next, deﬁne O as the completion of M—i.e., the set
of all properties that extend a bad thing for S:
O ,
[
M2M
" M
= fT j (9M 2 M : M  T)g; (C.1)
where the equality follows by the deﬁnition of " M.
Since each such property T violates S, we would sus-
pect that O is the complement of S. This is indeed the
case:
Claim. O = S
Proof. (By mutual containment.)
() Suppose T 2 O. Then by equa-
tion C.1, there is some M 2 M such
that M  T. By the deﬁnition of M,
any extension of M is an element of S.
Since T is such an extension, T 2 S.
18() Suppose T 2 S. Then T = 2 S, so by
the deﬁnition of hypersafety, (9M 2
Obs : M  T ^ (8T0 2 Prop :
M  T0 =) T0 = 2 S)). Consider
that M. It must be a member of M, by
deﬁnition. Since M  T, we have that
T 2 O by equation C.1.
All that remains is to show that O is open. First, note
that " M, for any M 2 Obs, is by deﬁnition an ele-
ment of O
SB. Thus each of the sets " M in the deﬁ-
nition of O is open. Second, by the deﬁnition of open
sets, a union of open sets is open. O is such a union,
and is therefore open.
() Let C be an arbitrary closed set. We need to show that
it is also hypersafety. Our strategy is to identify, for
any property T not in C, a bad thing for T. If such
a bad thing exists for all T, then C is by deﬁnition
hypersafety.
Since C is closed, it is by deﬁnition the complement of
an open set. By Proposition 4, we can therefore write
C as follows:
C =
[
i
" Mi; (C.2)
where each Mi is an observation.
Let T be an arbitrary property such that T = 2 C, or
equivalently, such that T 2 C. Then T must be in at
least one of the inﬁnite unions in equation C.2. Thus,
there must exist an i such that
T 2 " Mi
= fU 2 Prop j Mi  Ug; (C.3)
where the equality follows from the deﬁnition of ".
We construct the bad thing M for T by deﬁning:
M , Mi:
We have that M  T, because of equation C.3.
To show that M is a bad thing for T, consider any
T0  M. By the deﬁnition of M, T0  Mi. By
equation C.3, it follows that T0, like T, is a member of
" Mi. By equation C.2, T0 2 C. Therefore, T0 = 2 C.
We have now shown that for any T = 2 C, there exists
an M  T, such that for all T0  M, T0 = 2 C. Thus
C is hypersafety, by deﬁnition.
Proposition 6. LHP = D
Proof. By mutual containment.
() Let L be an arbitrary liveness hyperproperty. We need
to show that L is dense. By the deﬁnition of dense,
we must therefore show that L intersects every non-
empty open set. So let O be an arbitrary non-empty
open set. We need to show that L \ O is non-empty.
By Proposition 4 and the deﬁnition of open, we can
write O as
S
i " Mi. Consider an arbitrary Mi. Since
L is hyperliveness, there exists a T  Mi such that
T 2 L. Further, by the deﬁnition of ", we have that
T 2 O. Therefore, T 2 L \ O, and it follows that L
is dense, by deﬁnition.
() Let D be an arbitrary dense set. To show that D is
hyperliveness, we must show that any observation T
can be extended to a property T0 contained in D—i.e.,
(8T 2 Obs : (9T0 2 Prop : T  T0 ^ T0 2 D)).
So let T be an arbitrary observation. Let OT be the
completion of T:
OT , " T
= fT0 2 Prop j T  T0g (C.4)
OT isanelementofO
SB, thesubbaseofourtopology,
by deﬁnition. Thus, by the deﬁnition of a subbase, OT
isanopenset. Bythedeﬁnitionofadenseset(whichis
that a dense set intersects every open set), we therefore
have that OT \ D 6= ;. Let T0 be any element in the
set OT \ D. By equation C.4, we have T  T0.
We have now shown that, for an arbitrary observation
T, there exists a property T0 such that T  T0 and
T0 2 D. Therefore, D is hyperliveness, by deﬁnition.
Theorem 4. O = VL(O)
The lower Vietoris topology VL(T ) on underlying
topology T over space X is deﬁned as the topology induced
by subbase VSB
L (T ) [37]. The subbase is deﬁned as fol-
lows:
VSB
L (T ) , fhOi j O 2 T g;
where hTi is deﬁned as follows:
hTi , fU 2 P(X) j U \ T 6= ;g:
Operators [] (from Section 2) and hi bear some similarity
to the modal logic operators  (necessity) and  (possibil-
ity). For property T, [T] denotes the set of all reﬁnements
of T—i.e., the hyperproperty in which T is necessary. Sim-
ilarly, hTi denotes the set of all properties that share a trace
with T—i.e., the hyperproperty in which T is always possi-
ble.
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() Suppose O 2 O. By the deﬁnitions of a base
and of O, we can write O as
S1
i " Mi, where
each Mi is an element of Obs.21 Now we calculate:
S1
i " Mi
= h deﬁnition of " i
S1
i fT j T  Mig
= h deﬁnition of  i
S1
i fT j (8 mij 2 Mi : (9t 2 T : mij  t))g
= h deﬁnition of " i
S1
i fT j (8 mij 2 Mi :" mij \ T 6= ;)g
= h deﬁnition of hi i
S1
i fT j (8 mij 2 Mi : T 2 h" miji)g
= h deﬁnition of \ i
S1
i
T
jh" miji
Since " mij 2 OB by deﬁnition, and OB  O by the
deﬁnition of base, we have that h" miji 2 VSB
L (O).
Thus, by the deﬁnition of subbase,
S1
i
T
jh" miji 2
VL(O). Therefore, by the calculation above, we can
conclude O 2 VL(O).
() Suppose O 2 VL(O). By the deﬁnition of sub-
base and VL, we can write O as
S1
i
T
jhOiji, where
each Oij is an element of O. Now we calculate:
S1
i
T
jhOiji
= h deﬁnition of hi i
S1
i
T
jfT j T \ Oij 6= ;g
Since Oij is open in the base topology O, it can be
rewritten a union of base open sets " tijk, where each
tijk is a ﬁnite trace:
Oij =
1 [
k
" tijk:
We continue calculating:
= h rewriting Oij i
S1
i
T
jfT j T \ (
S1
k " tijk) 6= ;g
21We decorate quantiﬁcations (such as
S
and 8) with 1 to denote an
inﬁnite range, and with  to denote a ﬁnite range.
= h set theory i
S1
i fT j (8 j : (91 k : T \ " tijk 6= ;))g
= h deﬁnition  i
S1
i fT j (8 j : (91 k : ftijkg  T))g
= h set theory; let k0 be the k guaranteed above
to exist for a given i and j i
S1
i fT j
S
j tijk0  Tg
= h let Mi =
S
j tijk0 i
S1
i fT j Mi  Tg
= h deﬁnition of " i
S1
i " Mi
Finally, since Mi is a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite traces, it is an
element of Obs. So by deﬁnition, " Mi 2 O
SB. Thus
by the deﬁnition of base,
S1
i " Mi 2 O. Therefore,
by the calculation above, we can conclude O 2 O.
Corollary 1. SHP = (f[S] j S 2 SPg)
Proof. Let S be an arbitrary safety hyperproperty. By The-
orem 5, S is a closed set in topology O. By Theorem 4, S is
thus also a closed set in topology VL(O). By the deﬁnition
of closed, S is the complement of an open set in topology
VL(O). By the deﬁnition of a base, we can thus write S as
unions of intersections of base elements. Letting denote
set complement, we calculate:
S
= h deﬁnition of base i
S1
i
T
jhOiji
= h deﬁnition of hi i
S1
i
T
jfT j T \ Oij 6= ;g
= h double negation i

S1
i
T
jfT j T \ Oij 6= ;g
= h set theory i

T1
i
S
jfT j T \ Oij = ;g
20= h set theory i

T1
i
S
jfT j T  Oijg
= h deﬁnition of [] i

T1
i
S
j [Oij]
Removing a complement from each side of the above
equation, we obtain
S =
1 \
i
 [
j
[Oij]:
Since each Oij is open in topology O, we have that Oij is
closed in O. By the fact that closed sets in O correspond
to safety properties [3], Oij is a safety property. There-
fore, S is the inﬁnite intersection of ﬁnite unions of safety
properties, and by deﬁnition of  must be an element of
(f[S] j S 2 SPg).
Similarly, given an arbitrary element of (f[S] j S 2
SPg), the same reasoning used above establishes that it is
also an element of SHP. Therefore, by mutual containment,
the two sets are equal.
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